Iceland had initial misgivings about the EU's capacity created in 1999 for military crisis management. In the current debate over Iceland's EU application, questions have been raised about the possible impact of CSDP on the nation's non-military status. In fact the CSDP is designed to respect national choices in defence; requires unanimity on new actions; and allows case-bycase decisions on participation. Preliminary study of six other small states in the EU suggests that none of them has been obliged by membership to abandon national preferences in this field, though all have made special efforts to support EU police and civilian operations -an area where Iceland is also well qualified to contribute.. The more significant effects of EU member ship for Icelandic security might in fact come in other, 'softer' areas including EU obligations for mutual assistance in civil emergencies.
Introduction and Background
Iceland's relationship with the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP -formerly European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP 1 -has always been a sensitive one, even if not always openly controversial. In 1998-9 when EU mem ber states were preparing for the first time to give the Union a capacity for military action under its own command, Icelandic representatives warned about the risk of duplicating NATO and weakening the trans-Atlantic bond. Together with Turkey, when ESDP procedures were elaborated in the year 2000, Iceland complained about the limited rights given to European NATO states who were not full EU members (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2006) .
Icelandic policy-shapers had more general reasons, even if not overtly expressed, for seeing more that was problematic than profitable in the EU's new initiative. First, ESDP was designed to limit the EU's military role to deploying forces on peace missions in other people's conflicts, rather than acting jointly in Europe's own defence.
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STJÓRNMÁL & STJÓRNSÝSLA (Steering clear of "hard" defence meant that the non-allied member states Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden could have equal ownership of the new policy and connected operations.) Living in a small state with no national armed forces, Iceland's 20 th -century leaders defined security almost exclusively in terms of military/territorial threats, and saw the USA as the only credible protector (Ómarsdóttir, 2008) : they could thus expect no added value for Iceland's own predicament from the EU's efforts. Secondly, the goals and ethos of ESDP were primarily shaped by France and Britain, two ex-imperial and interventionist "semi-large" powers. These nations' continuing readiness to use force worldwide, and their patently interventionist defence policies and structures, could hardly have contrasted more sharply with Iceland's strong attachment to its non-military status and the promotion of peace, and its tendency to identify with small state "underdogs" in world affairs. 2 Once Turkey's chief concerns had been addressed in a political deal of late 2002, however, and NATO as a whole was ready to support the first ESDP operations, Iceland had no basis for further obstruction. Indeed it chose to contribute police and other civilian personnel to two early EU missions in the Balkans: the EU police operation launched in 2003 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the brief preventive military deployment of the same year in FYROM. 3 These inputs were made through the Icelandic Crisis Response Unit (ICRU) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which also serviced UN-led, NATO-led and ad hoc operations (Bailes and Thorhallsson, 2006 ; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ICRU), n.d.a.). In 2004, however, when the EU created a new European Defence Agency for armaments and defence technology collaboration, 4 Iceland decided -in contrast to Norway -not to take up its option to join in EDA activities through an Administrative Arrangement (Bailes and Guðmundsson, 2009 ). Iceland lacks a defence industry as well as armed forces, and popular feeling is broadly hostile to the global arms trade's "merchants of death".
Formerly an issue for the experts, CSDP has surfaced in broader public debates following Iceland's application in 2009 for EU membership. 5 Membership itself remains very controversial, with only around 35% of Icelanders expressing clear support in a Gallup Capacent poll of August 2011. 6 While Icelandic concerns of both a practical and psychological kind are manifold (Avery, Bailes and Thorhallsson 2011) , any suggestion that membership might oblige the country to modify its non-military stance or, indeed, other basics of its external policy is among the touchiest of all issues. Anti-EU campaigners who claimed in May 2010 7 that the EU would force young Icelanders to join a "European army" were right to expect that there would be massive opposition to any such coerced militarization. At the same time, concerns on the Right and in parts of the political centre that the EU might be foolishly and needlessly competing with NATO have not entirely disappeared. 8 Thus, while the official negotiating position signals Iceland's readiness to take part in CSDP as a non-military nation (but without EDA membership), 9 pressure might be expected from some quarters for a complete opt-out from CSDP on the Danish model 10 -or other possible forms of limited engagement. The argument could yet take further turns depending both on anti-EU campaigners' tactics and developments from the official side. (Bailes and Messervy-Whiting, 2011) . Second, we present the results of empirical research into the experiences of six of the EU's smallest existing members, most of which joined in 2004 after the establishment of ESDP (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta). How far have they been drawn into ESDP/CSDP and EDA activities, and can any changes in their general defence practices and profiles be traced to these new European commitments? This section rests on new empirical research by co-author Örvar Þorri Rafnsson and raises interesting questions about small states' role in European defence generally. The closing section then sums up the prima facie implications for Iceland, while setting the defence issue in a wider perspective of the EU's relevance for national security overall.
Iceland and the EU's Common Security and

CSDP Obligations and Commitments a) The legal framework
The starting-point for understanding nations' legal position in relation to CSDP is the EU's Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009 (European Union, 2007 . With the changes that Lisbon brought, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) now contains an amalgam of defence provisions dating partly from the 1990s, when the EU first spoke of "progressively framing" a common defence policy; partly from December 1999 when the Helsinki European Council decisions launched ESDP as the EU's military arm for crisis management (European Union, 1999); 11 and thirdly from the EU's constitution-drafting process of 2003 onwards. In legal and institutional terms this has created a clearer picture of CSDP than ever before; but the relevant clauses should be read together with other more general Treaty provisions, notably those delimiting EU "competence"', and those defining the Common Foreign and Security Policy -of which CSDP is part. 12 In brief, under Lisbon, defence and security remain areas of national authority where each member state decides its own policy and affiliations. Article 4 of the consolidated TEU could hardly state this more clearly: "[This Treaty] shall respect [the Member States'] essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State." Further, in two different places the Lisbon Treaty stresses that nothing in its terms prejudices "the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States". While these words were drafted to reassure the EU's six current non-NATO members 13 who have so far rejected collective defence guarantees, they could just as well be taken as protecting a state's sovereign right -for example -to 
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Nevertheless, any new EU member that does not explicitly opt out from CSDP commits itself to accept the established policies, and to support EU actions that are ongoing or may be approved in future. The TEU explains that member states are expected to "support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity…" (Article 24.3). What this covers in terms of defence activities is clarified in Article 42 of the Treaty, which declares the EU's intent to carry out "missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter". Article 43.1 lists the possible types of such actions, ranging from humanitarian rescue and disarmament assistance to tougher forms of military crisis management including "peace enforcement". What choices individual EU members have regarding these missions is discussed further below.
The one Treaty provision that may seem to contradict this focus on other people's conflicts is the new Article 42.7, which states that if any member state suffers an act of military aggression on its territory, the other members will have "an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power". At first sight this might seem to create a collective defence, or "alliance", relationship among all EU states on the same lines as NATO: but intra-EU negotiations left this Treaty passage with three idiosyncratic features that strongly dilute its practical meaning (European Parliament, 2009) . First, like the Treaty's general defence clauses, the text includes a proviso that "Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation" (present authors' italics). Thus if Iceland, as an EU member, joined in an action to help Finland it would be doing so through NATO, with the same provisos and understandings that govern its present Alliance membership. Secondly, Article 42 repeats the language about respecting national particularities, making clear that Finland and Sweden for their part remain free of binding defence guarantees. 14 Thirdly, saying that member states will "have an obligation" to help a member in trouble leaves a loophole for them to acknowledge the obligation but not do anything about it, or (for example) to offer a purely political response.
Furthermore, when Article 42.7 is seen in the perspective of other Lisbon Treaty provisions, it is striking that no steps whatsoever are prescribed to follow it up in the day-to-day work of CDSP -which stays firmly focused on voluntary actions abroad. Nor are the EU's collective organs in Brussels given any role of oversight, planning, or support for such "hard" defence assistance among member states. This is the more noteworthy by contrast with the new Article 222 introduced by Lisbon in the context of civil emergency policy, which not only commits EU members to help each other with all available means in the case of terrorist attacks or major natural disasters, but (Rhinard and Melander, 2010) . Thus Article 222 begins: "The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States…" (present authors' italics). More will be said below about the relevance of this for Iceland.
Other procedural details also protect the diversity and individual choices of member states in defence. The Lisbon Treaty introduces the possibility of "permanent structured cooperation" (PESCO), whereby a group of member states with higher military standards and ambitions may launch their own initiatives so long as others remain free to join. Conversely, the full group of EU members may delegate a particular task -operational, or capacity building -to a smaller group of willing nations. Finally, the Treaty provides that all decisions in CSDP and CFSP will continue to be taken by unanimity. Any state with strong objections can thus wield a veto, or alternatively, abstain and declare that for its part it will not apply the decision reached. 15 The only way majority voting could be used is on certain implementing decisions within a PSC project, exclusively among the participating states.
b) Ownership of armed forces in the EU
In 1952, France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux states signed the Treaty on a European Defence Community, designed to create an integrated European army with command arrangements separate from NATO. But France's own National Assembly rejected the treaty, and since then, there has neither been any form of "EU army" nor any proposal to create one. The very first paragraph in Lisbon's defence provisions underlines this by stating that the EU's crisis management tasks "shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States" (Art. 42.1).
The only cases in which European states have put their forces under collective command in peacetime have been in NATO's joint army and air force units in Germany (much reduced since the cold war), in NATO's joint military headquarters (also now reduced in numbers and size), and in the permanent headquarters of a few small "Euro-forces" set up voluntarily by groups of European partners, of which the Franco-German Eurocorps 16 is the best known. The EU itself has never set up a permanent military command HQ, and the UK continues to oppose French, German and Benelux pressure to create one. 17 Instead, the EU Military Staff in Brussels includes an Operations Centre that helps to plan and launch both military and nonmilitary missions. To execute military tasks, the Council chooses each time an Operation Commander and a Force Commander (on the ground), borrowing HQ elements as necessary from NATO, a member nation, or (for the Force HQ) a Euro-force.
Since 2004 the EU has asked its nations to volunteer to create "Battle Groups" of roughly 1500 personnel each, ready to deploy rapidly as the kernel of an overseas operation. 18 Some larger nations have offered a whole Battle Group themselves while others have banded to together; thus Sweden, Norway and Finland created a Nordic
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Battle Group with smaller contributions from Estonia and Ireland. These groups may draw up contingency plans and go on exercises together, but their elements continue under national control and in their original location. In fact, it has never yet proved possible to deploy a ready-made Battle Group for an EU operation: and some find it inherently unlikely, since all participating nations would need to be equally keen on an operation -and able to spare their best troops for it -at the given moment.
With no EU army, there can be no duty of military service at European level. In fact, most EU nations gave up conscription some time ago in favour of volunteer professional forces, or are currently phasing it out. If they no longer oblige their young men to serve for the country's own defence, it is hard to see why any government would do so for an EU that cannot even offer true military protection in return (see the previous section). 19 In fact, several nations -including Nordic oneswill only send volunteer personnel on EU, as well as NATO and UN, missions.
c) EU handling of force capabilities
In 1999 when ESDP was designed, officials and academics discussed whether the EU should set "convergence criteria" as it had for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), specifying for instance a set percentage of GDP to be spent on defence. The idea was quickly dropped for both political and practical reasons. EU members' defence postures and philosophies were just too diverse, with their key features often underpinned by hard-to-change constitutional provisions. Besides, the sum of money spent -or even the designation of forces as deployable -provides no guarantee of their true quality, or of compatibility with other states' personnel (Bailes, 1999) . Instead, the EU followed NATO's de facto example by assuming that countries would contribute differently according to their situation and ability. Capabilities policy would urge and help each country to do the best it could, rather than "harmonizing" defence standards like those for, e.g., food products or clean water. Accordingly, the December 1999 Helsinki decision described the total size of the force pool that the EU should have available for operations, together with key assets such as transport means and communications. It left states to say what they would contribute within this total, after which a scrutiny process would be applied to check, advise on, and improve the quality of their offerings. The overall force capacity required was named the "Headline Goal" and subsequent updates of EU requirements have kept that term. 20 In parallel, following an initiative first pushed by Sweden during 1999, the EU has asked states to identify suitable police and civilian personnel for its non-military missions, and provides parallel procedures to review and help develop these.
There has been some discussion in the Icelandic context over whether the EU could oblige a state to produce military capabilities for its missions if that state has not had military forces before. This not only goes against common sense, but would clearly violate the Treaty provisions quoted in sub-section (a) above that safeguard a nation's own defence choices and require the EU to 'respect' them. The relevant language in Article 42.3 of TEU actually states: "Member States shall make civil and military capabilities available [for EU missions]…Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities". These clauses refer to the totality of member states, and can hardly be construed to mean that every single state must produce capabilities of both sorts: rather, the second phrase reads most naturally as committing states to improve whatever capacities they possess. Finally, given that NATO has accepted Iceland's non-military status for over 60 years, the EU Treaty's clauses that safeguard NATO's primacy in defence also militate against attempts to question Iceland's -or any other Ally's -fundamental security choices.
How would Iceland, as a non-military state, deal with the EU Military Committee, EU Military Staff, and the structures for screening military capabilities? Practical solutions would most probably echo decades-long practice in NATO, whereby Icelandic civilian (and/or police) representatives fill the national seat when necessary, and the slot is left vacant when purely military work is in hand.
d) EU operations
Each new EU operation is approved by the Council unanimously. Decisions are prepared in the Ambassador-level Political and Security Committee at Brussels which then exercises general oversight of the mission, with details delegated to the contributing nations' group and ad hoc commanders. A collective financing mechanism called ATHENA was established in 2004 to allow common costs of EU military missions -eg for reconnaissance trips and central management -to be met from EU funds. 21 All member states contribute on a scale proportioned to Gross National Income: thus Malta is assessed at 0.04% of total EU GNI and pays that percentage of common costs for 3 missions currently receiving ATHENA support (Iceland, if a member, would currently be assessed for a slightly smaller share.) All other costs of military inputs such as manpower, equipment and transport are borne -as in NATO -by individual contributing states.
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Just as for operations led by the UN and NATO, the states wishing to provide personnel and/or assets for the mission come forward as volunteers, 23 and can also decide to pull out before the mission's end. Further, the Council decisions concerning the start, renewal, and closure of a mission -including any concomitant agreements with the UN, NATO or others -are taken like all CSDP decisions by unanimity. A veto is possible, and a state may also make clear that it cannot or does not want to take part in a given action; though if it lets the decision go through, it is expected not to actually sabotage the mission for instance by making trouble in inter-institutional communications.
e) EU armaments policies
European defence industry collaboration was discussed in a NATO sub-group until the early 1990s, when the European defence organization Western European Union (WEU) created its own armaments policy forum (WEAG) and research coordination agency (WEAO). 24 After the launch of ESDP in 1999, the idea of creating a European Defence Agency to similarly inherit WEU's equipment-related work won support during discussions on an EU "constitution". The EDA was finally given the go-ahead 2005-6: so that the EDA has become "the" body for discussing European defence industrial collaboration and promoting related science and technology (Bailes and Messervy-Whiting, 2011) . It is an inter-state civilian agency supervised by the EU High Representative for CFSP, with national Defence Ministers as its board of directors. Member states now also accept that the European Commission has a role in supporting the defence and security industry, through Community research funding and market liberalization: hence the adoption of two 'defence market' directives tabled by the Commission in 2007, which are coming into force at the time of writing. They aim respectively to make national defence procurement more competitive, and to allow freer intraCommunity trade in products for collaborative manufacture (Flemish Peace Institute, 2008) .
Article 45.2 TEU states that "The European Defence Agency shall be open to all member States wishing to be a part of it" -language that accommodates Denmark's decision not to join the EDA because of its general opt-out from CSDP. No other member state has yet stayed out, although Ireland has had some internal debate about withdrawing. Iceland would be automatically offered EDA membership upon EU accession, but could decide freely whether to accept (a procedural situation that can be depicted either as 'not opting in or 'opting out' according to the point of view). Not joining would be consistent with the fact that Iceland never participated in the relevant NATO bodies nor in WEAG/WEAO, besides abstaining from liaison with the EDA as a non-member after 2005. However, Icelandic companies making multiuse products (like specialized vehicles) or components that have possible military uses may take advantage of the EDA's open tendering platform for small and medium enterprises, regardless of the country's official participation in the Agency (Bailes and Guðmundsson, 2009) .
It is worth noting that the EU also has well-developed policies on the abolition and control of specific armaments and on curbing the arms trade. 25 These include a common export control code on conventional weapons, adopted as a binding Common Position in CFSP; 26 legally binding Regulations that prevent member states from exporting Weapons of Mass Destruction-related materials and technology or instruments designed for torture; common efforts to support various treaties abolishing chemical, biological, and other "inhumane" weapons; practical measures to curb trade out of Europe and within other regions in small arms and light weapons; and support for a UN Arms Trade Treaty. While such policies are developed outside CSDP proper, the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 43.1) also foresees EU operations for arms monitoring, dis armament, and related assistance purposes. Iceland has aligned itself with the great majority of such EU actions including the export control code. As an EU member it would gain full ownership of the Union's internal and external arms restraint policies, and a say in their further development.
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Experiences of the smallest EU member states
Determining how EU membership has affected the defence policy and practice of any given country is not simple, not least because it demands assessment both of quantitative factors and intangibles. Any concrete changes triggered by CSDP should in principle be restricted by the policy's own scope to capability planning (civil and military) for crisis management, plus the various armaments issues just discussed. However, meeting capability targets for deployable forces often has knock-on effects for a nation's whole defence structure and spending pattern, as well as its preferences in equipment and operational partners. The problem is to judge whether any given shift in defence practice -for instance, the phasing out of conscription in Sweden and Germany 27 -reflects EU influence specifically, as compared with the parallel pressures exerted by NATO (and bilaterally by Washington); 28 or operational experiences gained under non-EU flags, which have typically involved sterner challenges; and/or general shifts in the strategic-technical environment such as soaring equipment costs, the new importance of communications and the pressure for triservice (land, air, sea) coordination.
In fact, the most dramatic finding made in comparative studies of EU/NATO nations' defence performance in the 21 st century (for instance Witney, 2008 and Giegerich, 2008 ) is how little real convergence there has been in these practical terms. Britain and France still stand out as having defence postures and activity patterns much closer to each other's than either of them is to Germany. In the North, Finland, Sweden and Norway may work in the same EU Battle Group and coordinate some arms programmes; but there is still a wide gap between Finland's territorial focus and large standing army, Sweden's neutralist ideals and minimal standing forces, and Norway's High Northern emphasis. Denmark, besides distancing itself from many "Nordic" projects, is more focussed on non-traditional attacks and the most open to using its army for internal security (Bailes, Herolf and Sundelius, 2006; Bailes, 2007) . Across Europe as a whole, levels of military spending and of general defence effort still vary hugely, as do cultural/normative traits such as trust or lack of it in the military, the arming of police, acceptance of casualties, or willingness to send troops far abroad.
29 Pro-CSDP writers such as Witney (2008) and Giegerich (2008) have thus been left lamenting the apparent weakness of both the EU's and NATO's impact in terms of "levelling up" national performance, or promoting rational specialization and burden-sharing.
There is however a larger, intangible dimension of potential 'Europeanization', whereby states are impelled in a broadly converging direction by 'socialization', norm diffusion, and emergent collective interests as well as explicit standardization; and where self-perceptions of their roles -as well as calculations of tactical interest -are moulded by a new context of intra-EU power-play and burden-sharing (Ladrech, 2010) . This process undoubtedly extends to external policies including the security/defence dimension, where it need not be limited by the EU's inchoate formal competence in these fields. Acting on domestic players as well as elites, it could prompt policy changes that appear self-generated but which comparative studies will STJÓRNMÁL & STJÓRNSÝSLA show as reflecting wider European trends. It has inspired new theoretical approaches as well as empirical enquiries, reflected in such compilations as (Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; Elgström and Smith, 2006) . It is better traced through behaviour and discourse than quantitative indicators, as it may mean using a given defence capacity in new ways and with new understandings of its purpose. However, as with the direct study of defence policy, it faces the problem of disentangling specific EU influences from other systemic, environmental, and conceptual agents of change.
The literature on Europeanization in security and defence is rich in national studies but these have so far been mainly of the largest European countries, of medium-sized ones (Tonra, 2001 ), non-NATO states (Luif, 2003) or regional com parisons (Rieker, 2006 , which covers four Nordic states but not Iceland). Should we expect the very smallest European states to be more, or less, amenable on average to the intangible and tangible pressures for European conformity? The argument could go both ways. The literature generally sees small states as more prone to accept and even seek collective solutions given their openness, flexibility, and lack of complex ingrained traditions; but also because they have greater need of the strategic "shelter" provided by institutions in return (Thorhallsson, 2000 and 2011; Bailes and Thor hallsson, forthcoming) . Since they clearly cannot fight off attackers alone, it should make less practical difference how they design their forces or whether they send their best troops abroad. As producers (at most) of "niche" objects for use in collaborative defence production, they should welcome closer industrial integration and joint defence purchasing programmes. Overall, such states may seek "more Europe" (in any given field), not just because it costs them less and strengthens their sheltering institution(s), but also as a way to curb the national self-assertion of larger states (Katzenstein, 1997) .
All this, however, works best for small states that lack strong specific defence concerns and/or idiosyncratic defence and security traditions. If a small state has "hard" defence worries that the EU cannot resolve, it will seek shelter -and take its lead -from whichever other power or organization can help. If it has strong neoneutralist or pro-peace feelings, it may resent the larger EU members' pressure for military activism and try to resist further "militarization" of the Union. Either way, it is likely to see its own defence profile as a key part of sovereign identity, and be less flexible about change than some medium-sized nations that can adapt to a range of several possible military roles. Rather than seeking "more Europe" in defence, a small state of this kind should prefer to maintain today's CSDP with its strictly limited obligations and wide room for national variance.
To test which hypothesis holds good in practice, we have examined the five smallest states entering the EU in 2004 -Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta -and the smallest founding member, Luxembourg. Their population sizes are shown in Table Two Cyprus and Malta entered the EU as non-Allied states and in practice, Turkey would not countenance the former's accession to NATO. As for concrete security concerns, the three Baltic States' strategic agendas are dominated by their large Russian neighbour; the Republic of Cyprus has to cope with a divided island created by an earlier Turkish invasion, where decades of peace negotiations have so far failed; Malta is exposed to instability from the Southern side of the Mediterranean, but Luxembourg is completely shielded by its neighbours. This group thus offers a wide span of variety in defence statuses and policies, as a starting-point for tracing any signs of EU-mediated convergence.
In the following sub-sections, the evolution of defence resources, policy and practice in the six selected states is traced and compared on the basis of the best available international statistics, covering the period from 2005 (just after the five new states' EU entry) to 2010. On the showing above, such a quantified approach can only be the first stage in assessing the full potential scope of Europeanization, but it may provide foundation and stimulus for more sophisticated studies in future. Table 1 shows the gross resources invested by the six selected states in their defence, measured by the cash value and GDP share of their military spending. It immediately highlights their diversity, with Estonia currently spending 2.3% of GDP on defenceamong the highest percentages in Europe -and Cyprus close behind at 2%, while Luxembourg and Malta are among the Union's lowest-spenders. There is no apparent correlation with overall economic performance, and it makes most sense to link the exceptional efforts made by Estonia and Cyprus with their difficult strategic situations -Estonia being the closest of the Baltic States to Russia, and having experienced tumultuous relations with Moscow recently. As noted below, however, the Estonian figures may also be affected by major military restructuring in recent years. If Cyprus and Estonia are left aside, the four other small partners show a parallel trend during their EU membership. Their spending as a share of GDP either remained constant or went down (Latvia, Malta), while cash spending also decreased in some years either because of shrinking GDP (Lithuania in 2009) or deliberate defence cuts. Luxembourg meanwhile has maintained its modest effort at a constant level over decades. As a result, the average of these six states' spending in terms of GDP has slightly declined from 2005 (1.5%) to 2009 (1.4%). Secondly, over these same five years, the range of variety in states' efforts marginally increased, with Estonia's spending level of 2.3% of GDP in 2009 outstripping Cyprus's earlier record of 2.2%. The only possible preliminary conclusion from these figures is that the fact of belonging to the EU has neither brought convergence in these countries' quantitative efforts, nor pushed them consistently towards higher levels of spending. Table 2 compares the military structures of the selected countries and their effort in terms of maintaining full-time military personnel. Here the pattern is less straightforward, but shows a distinction between the three Baltic States -who have continued right up to the present with major military re-structuring programmes -and the three other states who have kept a constant structure, in Malta's case with slightly declining numbers. Again we see no immediate sign of homogenizing impact from EU membership. In the Baltic region, Estonia's above-average military effort is reflected in the recent increase in the overall size of its forces (i.e. standing troops combined with reserves); and it is now unusual among European states -though similar to Finland -in not having abolished national conscription. Latvia and Lithuania, following a broader European trend, abandoned conscription during the 2000s. In terms of the scale of effort, Latvia like Estonia has transferred some posts recently from reserve to standing forces, but has still been able to make some savings in its total military establishment since joining the EU. Lithuania has reduced its total forces very substantially with the transition to a Western-style reservist structure.
Overall defence effort: spending and force size
Participation in peace missions
Since ESDP's first experiments in 2003-2004, the EU has carried out over 20 peace missions of which most have involved police forces or civilians, while the one large military mission -EUFOR Althea -took over a NATO peace-keeping role in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Geographically the missions have been clustered in the Western Balkans, Europe's Eastern frontiers, the Middle East, and Africa. It is hard to say that any of these locations directly affects the territorial safety of any of our six small states, although Malta and Cyprus are naturally concerned about Middle Eastern and African developments, while the Baltic States have tried to encourage reform and Westernization in places like Moldova and Georgia.
Since small states' inputs are also unlikely to decide success or failure for any military action, why then should they contribute? Their votes cannot launch an operation but as contributors, they do at least gain a say in how it is designed and run, and may want to use that influence (inter alia) to moderate the larger states' conduct. Given the post-Cold War vogue for crisis management, it has been argued that small military actors are under pressure overall to shift their strategic stance from the territorial and passive to the active and outgoing (Rickli, 2008) . They may for instance want to buy favour and protection from the operation's larger leaders; they may seek to boost the institution's own image and efficiency in security work; they may seek valuable experience for their own operators, at much lower risk than in a real war or purely national action; or they may just feel a strong normative impulse to help the suffering. An insti tu tion like the EU, meanwhile, may like to appoint a commander from a small and/or non-Allied nation to underline its non-aggressive and altruistic goals -Sweden and Ireland have both played this role within ESDP. Prima facie, this should thus be fertile ground to look for evidence of Europeanization in strategic or tactical reasoning, discourse and behaviour. Tables 3 and 4 show which military and non-military EU operations each state has contributed to over the years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . The third column in each table shows how many personnel were provided in each year of participation, adding up to a total of person-years (in the fourth column) that provides a rough measure of overall effort. "ND" means no data and usually, no contribution. The findings show that EU small states have indeed been active across a wide range of types and locations of missions. Malta is the only country never to join military operations, while Cyprus -though also non-aligned in status -has participated in five. Of the six states, Luxembourg has invested in the largest range of EU military missions, reflecting its long history of commitment across the board to European integration. It is also the only small state to have joined a naval mission (the EU anti-piracy operation off Somalia). Estonia has sent the most troops of the six in total, mainly because it has remained in EUFOR Althea since 2004. Overall, these small contributors have been most drawn to EU military actions in the Western Balkan theatre, where they were already used to working with the UN and NATO. 
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The evidence of behavioural change, including convergence, is strongest regarding the EU's civilian and police missions, where all six states have made a deliberate and growing effort. They have supported police operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), the first ESDP mission launched by the EU; in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA and EUPAT); in the Palestine (EUPOL COPPS); the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL DR Congo) and in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan). They have provided personnel for recruitment and training in civilian crisis management (monitoring missions) in FYROM (EUMM), in the Indonesian province of Aceh (AMM), and the more recent 2008 mission in Georgia (EUMM), as well as the border management mission at the Rafah border crossing between Palestine and Egypt (EU BAM Rafah) and a training mission in Somalia (EUTM).
Most European states have found it harder to provide police and other civilian experts than soldiers on demand, for the obvious reason that non-military experts have full-time jobs at home in peacetime, and no reserves to speak of. It is therefore striking that all the small states have provided more civilians than troops for EU missions overall, and sometimes substantially more -including two of the Baltic States. This picture becomes clearer if we compare their pattern of contribution to NATO missions. In 2010, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania contributed as many as 139, 190 and 179 troops respectively for NATO's UN-mandated ISAF operation in Afghanistan, while Luxembourg provided 23 for KFOR in Kosovo and 9 for ISAF. Clearly, small countries that see NATO (and especially the USA) as 'sheltering' their own territorial integrity are going to make their best military efforts under a NATO, rather than an EU flag. The reverse logic holds good on UN peacekeeping, where few of Europe's small states now offer any manpower at all -perhaps because there is no clear payback to them from such purely "altruistic" efforts.
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It may be added that authors concerned about improving the EU's military performance have generally given short shrift to the smallest Member States and to the whole idea of such minimal contributions. Building a mission from many small inputs aggravates problems of command and consistency, while small nations must typically beg for help with transport and other logistical support and supplies. They may be more welcome in "niche" roles outside the main combat structure, such as the military police that Estonia offers for the Nordic Battle Group. Nick Witney (2008) argues for basing EU intervention planning on a smaller number of more substantial contributors, while Jolyon Howorth (2009) offers a grading of EU nations' CSDP performance in which only Estonia out of our six states gets as far as the third rank. The other two Baltic States are relegated to the fourth rank, considered acceptable only in very specialized roles, and Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are placed in the fifth and last (Howorth, 2009) .
Defence equipment
None of the six selected small states is a recognized arms producer or exporter, though their companies may make 'niche' inputs to production elsewhere. All six have however consented to join the EU's European Defence Agency (EDA) and thus pay a The other main commitments of EDA membership are to attend twice-yearly meetings of armaments directors and of Defence Ministers, where general issues of EU defence industrial an research policy are discussed and contracts for new R+D projects are signed. These projects can demand much larger financial inputs depending on their scope and length, but participation is voluntary and in practice mostly limited to a circle of 7-8 larger states-often including Sweden because of its sizeable arms industry. Luxembourg has joined in several such contracts, including that for the A400M military transport aircraft, but EDA records show little evidence of the other small states having done likewise. One exception is Estonia's decision to join in a study during 2008-2010 on Future Maritime Mine Countermeasures -a subject of understandable interest given its concerns about Russia's naval activities in the Gulf of Finland.
Otherwise, the small states have been classed by the EDA itself as being among the "less involved" partners in the EU defence market; and it was on this logic that Malta was selected in October 2009 as the site for an EDA seminar called "R&T: All on Board". The topic of the event was how to encourage small-scale entities like small and medium enterprises (SMEs), academic researchers, and laboratories to consider niche skills and products that they could contribute to collaborative research. The EDA has continued to work in this direction i.a. by opening an online forum for civil suppliers of multi-use products, while the European Commission's latest "defence market" directives (see above) aim among other things to create a more level playing field for small contributors (Flemish Peace Institute, 2008) . Whether defence-minded small states will actually profit from such opportunities depends, however, much more on the activism of their companies than on government policy; and as argued above, there are ways that determined firms can promote their interests even without official EDA membership.
Summary of findings and conclusions for Iceland
This analysis has shown that the EU's defence-related policies are strongly grounded in the principles of national sovereignty and choice. The existing member states have chosen a policy focus -on crisis management -and a method of nurturing and combining national inputs that both presuppose, and are designed to accommodate, a high degree of national variation in defence policies, postures and capabilities. All relevant decisions are made, even after entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in intergovernmental mode, allowing the possibility of national veto as well as other forms of opting-out. This already provides a prima facie assurance that Iceland's possible EU entry would not require change in the relevant Icelandic policies and practices. In particular, there is no reason why the EU should hesitate to accept and confirm Iceland's non-military status, as NATO has done for over sixty years already. In resource terms, the only financial inputs (ATHENA contributions) regularly required 
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STJÓRNMÁL & STJÓRNSÝSLA from member states are very small, and it will be for the authorities in Reykjavik to decide whether or not to take part in specific EU operations carrying additional costs.
The preliminary research on other small-state experiences presented in section 3 above points the same way. The smallest states entering the Union so far do not seem to have been impelled to make any changes in practical defence structures that could be prima facie traced to EU pressures or to convergent, 'Europeanized' choices. Rather, their national systems and priorities continue to show a wide range of divergence even after seven full years in the EU (and much longer in Luxembourg's case). Most have continued reducing their overall defence efforts, measured in money and men, since 2004. Politically, meanwhile, Cyprus has shown that a small state can insist on its perceived vital interests even when isolated, as it has repeatedly vetoed proposals for EU cooperation with Turkey.
Where our six small-state examples do show clear signs of 'Europeanized' convergence is in their preferential, and growing, contributions to the EU's peace missions using police and other civilian experts. The fact that Iceland can only offer such contributions would not therefore seem eccentric nor imply a second-class status. The EU has already welcomed personnel from Iceland as an 'opter-in', as detailed above. Should Iceland wish to increase its inputs both to individual missions and civil capability planning after EU entry, the choice is in its own hands. True, this might mean doing proportionally less in similar UN and/or NATO operations, where Iceland has been more active than most European small states in recent years. 32 The UN activism may however have been tactically linked with Iceland's candidature for the UN Security Council in 2008; and if Iceland still wanted to go on contributing elsewhere, it could always opt to increase ICRU's activities overall.
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Iceland's other main choice to make would be on EDA membership, where both traditions and norms, and domestic-political tactics may come into play. If the decision is confirmed to stay out of the agency, this will not in practice set Iceland too far apart from other small EU members, given their low profiles hitherto; nor does it close off all opportunities for Icelandic companies. Absent from the EDA table, however, Iceland would miss the chance to discuss requirements and research priorities in some areas prima facie relevant to its situation, such as maritime surveillance systems in the High North (Bailes and Gudmundsson, 2009) .
In general, this analysis suggests that Iceland has been right from the start to see the EU's defence efforts as offering no 'hard' strategic shelter for itself -or indeed, any small state. Small EU members can, rather, play three main roles in CSDP: as moderators of any excessive 'militarization' or risk-taking that the large powers might be inclined to; as contributors of benign values, good policy ideas (like the civilian capacities system) and niche capabilities; and, in their own interest, by using contributions to leverage various indirect political/strategic benefits. Iceland could prima facie play all these roles if it joined, adding its own non-military values and expertise to the EU pool.
Is it right, however, to conclude that accession would have no greater significance than this for Iceland's own national security? Clearly not, because the EU exercises security functions -for its own members and the world -across multiple dimensions of which CSDP is almost the least significant. It has many other ways to help prevent and resolve conflict worldwide, notably through support for the UN, development assistance, mediation, inputs to reconstruction, and the arms-related policies mentioned above: all areas in which Iceland is already closely aligned with EU actions and values. As a full EU member, Iceland could also explore the benefits of wider European expertise, regulatory best practice, and team support for its own non-military security in many dimensions, ranging from cyber-security to climate change response and public health.
The Lisbon Treaty's new Article 222 (section 2 above) is particularly worth recalling here. It creates not just explicit guarantees among EU members, but roles for central staffs and funds, in protecting nations' physical and territorial security against all types of extreme event other than traditional war. It thus puts the EU in a position to defend members' lands and populations, using both civilian and military assets and skills, against all those destructive events that are most likely to happen: while NATO deals with formal military attacks that most probably never will (Rhinard and Melander, 2010) .
Since April 2011 Iceland has enjoyed a similar, if more simply expressed, guarantee of mutual help in civil contingencies from the four other Nordic states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). This Nordic 'solidarity clause' was adopted following intergovernmental discussion on Thorvald Stoltenberg's 2009 proposals for closer Nordic security and defence cooperation (Stoltenberg, 2009) . While Stoltenberg had hoped for a full military mutual guarantee, that caused various problems both for the nonallies and for Denmark, which was wary of confusing or diluting the primary defence role of NATO. Iceland and Finland might also wonder how much the other Nordics could really do to save them from a serious military assault. As a compromise, the 2011 declaration promises help in scenarios short of conventional war, such as cyberand terrorist attacks, as well as major natural disasters. Does this mean that Iceland has nothing left to gain from coming under the protection of the EU-wide Article 222 -bearing in mind the access it already enjoys to some security-related EU programmes through the EEA and Schengen? First, it is arguable that without that article it might have been harder, or taken longer, to reach the Nordic agreement in 2011. Once Finland and Sweden had judged the EU clause compatible with their non-allied status, extending the idea to two close neighbours became politically un-dramatic. More importantly, however, Iceland cannot be sure that the emergencies and longer-term security challenges it must face will all be ones where its Nordic neighbours are expert, and where their capacities (and willingness) to help are adequate. As an EU member it would have access to European civil capacities that are both much larger and far more varied -and for which no alternative is now, or probably ever will be, available through NATO. Finally, if Iceland wishes to be a giver as well as taker in security, it might find itself with much to offer, even as a small state, to less experienced small EU members and applicants across the wider Europe. It is thus at least arguable that the military limitations of CSDP, and the 
